The Anatomy of a Spin-Off by Jacobs, Robert A.
]1ue1au3ournat
VOLUME 1967 NUMBER 1
THE ANATOMY OF A SPIN-OFF
ROBERT A. JACOBS*
Section 355 of the Internal Revenue Code, which specially
treats certain forms of corporate reorganization, has been the con-
stant subject of both scholarly commentaiy and litigation. The
experience of functioning under these spin-off provisions has re-
sulted in clarification of the law and has also raised significant
questions as to its scope. The precise limits of the section remain
to some extent in a state of flux and await further exposition by
the courts.
INTRODUCTION
N THE twelve years since the enactment of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954, substantial progress has been made in- determining
what constitutes a tax-free corporate separation under section 355.1
That the law in this area is still undergoing significant change and
development may seem strange when one recalls that provisions
allowing tax-free corporate separations have been in the tax law
since 1918;2 that the 1954 Code provisions8 were in large measure
carryovers from the 1939 Code; 4 and that the Treasury Regulations,6
issued shortly after the 1954 Code was enacted, made a valiant at-
tempt to answer many of the troublesome questions which the drafts-
men anticipated would arise. The very nature of the corporate
0 Member of the New York Bar. B.B.A., 1957, University of Texas; LL.B., 1960,
LL.M. (in taxation), 1963, New York University. Mr. Jacobs is a member of the Office
of the Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Service. The views expressed are those of the
author and not official opinions of the Treasury Department or any unit of that
Department.
2 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 355. References in the text and notes are to the In-
ternal Revenue Code of 1954 unless otherwise indicated.
Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 202 (b), 40 Stat. 1060.
SINT. RFv. CODE Or 1954, § 355.
'Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 112(b) (11), added by ch. 521, § 317 (a) (11), 65 Stat. 493
(1951).
1 Treas. Reg. § 1.355 (1955).
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separation, however, with its inherent potential for converting ordi-
nary dividend income into immediate or ultimate capital gain, makes
it important to develop easy-to-apply, clear-cut rules that determine
whether or not the separation is tax-free. Unfortunately, a number
of questions have not, as yet, been supplied with clear and definite
answers.
Section 355 provides for the separation of one or more businesses
formerly operated, directly or indirectly, by a single corporation into
two or more corporate entities without the shareholder being re-
quired to recognize gain or loss with respect to stock distributed in
connection with the separation process. It allows the shareholders of
one corporation to divide their investment among two or more corpo-
rate entities. The post-distribution corporations collectively own the
same assets and operate the same business or businesses that the
single predecessor corporation formerly owned and operated.
The businesses separated must- have been actively conducted for
five years preceding the distribution and, in general, must have been
owned for at least five years by the distributing corporation. Typi-
cally, the corporate structure after the separation will consist of two
corporations owned directly by the shareholders. Before the distri-
bution these corporations may have been a parent and subsidiary;
the distributing corporation and a newly formed controlled corpora-
tion; or two newly formed controlled corporations.
The tax-free distribution may take any one of three forms:6
(1) The spin-off is similar to a dividend. Each shareholder of
the distributing corporation receives a pro rata share of the stock
of the distributed controlled corporation, while retaining his shares
in the distributing corporation. Under the 1954 Code the stock of
either an existing subsidiary or a newly created corporation can
qualify for a spin-off.
(2) The split-off is identical with the spin-off, except that the
stockholders of the distributing corporation surrender a portion of
their stock in the distributing corporation in exchange for the stock
of the controlled corporation. This method of corporate separation
6 Under the 1954 Code all three methods of corporate separation are tax-free unless
boot is involved or the separation fails to meet the requirements of § 355. In such cases,
divergent tax treatment may be accorded the three methods.
Unless otherwise indicated, references to "spin-off" in the remainder of this article
will also apply to split-ups and split-offs except where the context requires the restricted
meaning.
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involves a stock redemption. The stock of the controlled corpora-
tion may be distributed pro rata, as in the case of a spin-off, or where
the parties desire, it may be distributed disproportionately.
(3) In a split-up the parent corporation distributes the stock of
two or more of its subsidiaries to its shareholders as a part of a plan
of complete liquidation. The subsidiaries may be pre-existing or
newly created.
During the past twelve years .the Internal Revenue Service, the
courts, and tax advisors have frequently been called upon to deter-
mine whether a particular corporate separation should receive favor-
able treatment under section 355 in light of the statutory language
and the underlying philosophy of that section. The purpose of this
article is to examine the development and status of section 355 a
dozen years after its enactment and where possible, to point to some
of the problems which will confront taxpayers and the Service in the
years ahead.
HIsToRY
Spin-offs have a long and colorful tax history. They have been
recognized as an important means of allowing the business com-
munity to adjust its method of conducting business. As early as
1918 Congress approved tax-free split-ups.7 Spin-offs and split-offs
were approved by Congress in 1924.8 Congress and the courts have
recognized that the shareholders who received spin-off distributions
did not receive any additional economic interest as a result of the
distributions where the changes in corporate organization were es-
sentially changes only in form, with the stockholders continuing their
former interest in the original enterprise.9 Where before the corpo-
rate separation there was only one corporation owning assets and
conducting business, after the distribution there are two corporations
owning the same assets and conducting the same business. Where
formerly there was only one stock certificate, after the distribution
there are two. All the assets remain in "corporate solution" and
7Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 202 (b), 40 Stat. 1060.
8 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 203 (c), 43 Stat. 256 (spin-offs); Revenue Act of
1924, ch. 234, §§ 203 (b) (2), (h), 43 Stat. 256 (split-offs). Arguably, split-offs may
have received tax-free treatment under § 202 (b) of the Revenue Act of 1918 and
§ 202 (c) (2) of the Revenue Act of 1921. See H.R. RI. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1924), reprinted in 1939-1 (Part 2) Cum. BuLL. 241, 252-53.
0 See H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), reprinted in 1939-1 (Part 2)
Cum. BULL. 554, 564.
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absent some subsequent act on the part of one of the corpora-
tions, (for example, a liquidation) or the shareholder (for example,
a sale of his stock in one of the post-distribution corporations) no
economic change sufficient to warrant immediate taxation occurs.
Thus, the spin-off is one of the few 1954 Code provisions that allow
a corporation with ample earnings and profits to distribute prop-
erty (stock. in the controlled corporation) to its shareholders without
the recognition of gain by the shareholder.10
The tax-free status of corporate separations evidences congres-
sional recognition of the desirability of facilitating corporate struc-
tural flexibility. Prior to 1954, spin-offs, split-offs, and split-ups were
tax-free under the general corporate reorganization provisions.' In
Evelyn F. Gregory, 2 the taxpayer by meticulous compliance with
these general provisions attempted to distribute accumulated earn-
ings and receive capital gains treatment 3 for what were essentially
dividends. This design was to be' accomplished by transferring the
corporation's cash and marketable securities to a newly formed
corporation and then distributing the stock of the new corporation
to the taxpayer. The immediate liquidation of the new corporation
completed the series of steps necessary to place the assets in the hands
of the shareholder. The Board of Tax Appeals held that, by com-
plying with the letter of the "meticulously drafted" statute, 4 the
10 In other contexts, earnings and profits may be distributed to shareholders without
their recognizing any gain where fortuitous circumstances such as basis equal to dis-
tributions are present. See, e.g., INT. R v. Cona OF 1954, §§ 302, 303, 346. See also
§ 354 (distribution of stock and securities in reorganizations); Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-31 (b)
(2) (ii) (1955) (intercompany dividends eliminated in consolidated return).
". The spin-off was sanctioned by the reorganization definition which included a
transfer of part of a corporation's assets to a newly formed corporation in exchange
for a controlling stock interest, which was then distributed to the transferor's share-
holder. See, e.g., Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 112(g), 47 Stat. 197. The split.off
and split-up received similarly favorable treatment under other reorganization sections.
Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, §§ 112 (b) (3), (i) (I) (B), (i) (2), 47 Stat. 196.
22 27 B.T.A. 223 (1932), rev'd, 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934), aft'd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
See Jacobs, Spin-Offs: The Pre-Distribution Two Business Rule-Edmund P. Coady and
Beyond, 19 TAx L. Rav. 155, 157-59 (1964).
13 The shareholder who receives stock in a spin-off must allocate his adjusted basis
in the shares of the distributing corporation between the retained shares of the dis-
tributing corporation and the shares received in the controlled corporation in pro-
portion to their respective fair market values. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 358 (b) (2);
Treas. Reg. § 1.358-2 (a) (2) (1955). In the Gregory setting this provision enabled the
taxpayer to claim .that her capital- gain was properly measured by the difference between
her basis and the fair market value of the assets received in liquidation.
1427 B.T.A. at 225. See Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, §§ 112(g), (i) (1) (B), 45 Stat.
818.
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taxpayer was entitled to the unintended benefits of congressional
oversight. Refusing to be guided by the form of a transaction which
had as its purpose the avoidance of taxation, the Second Circuit and
the Supreme Court held that the distributions were actually divi-
dends.15 In reversing the Board, the two courts engrafted upon the
reorganization provisions the requirement that qualifying corporate
separations must be motivated by a valid business purpose as opposed
to the intent to avoid taxes. 16
The congressional reaction to the Board of Tax Appeals Gregory
decision was swift, albeit not too sure. Under the Revenue Act of
1934, all spin-off distributions were treated as dividends.'7  Sur-
prisingly, Congress did not also prohibit pro rata split-offs and split-
ups in the 1934 Act, even though some of these corporate separations
achieved the same economic results and possessed the same tax avoid-
ance potential as the prohibited spin-off.'8
In 1951, however, Congress restored tax-free status to the spin-
off under certain conditions designed to permit corporate flexibility
and at the same time prohibit the distribution of disguised divi-
dends.' 9 The Revenue Act of 1951 provided that where, pursuant
to a "plan of reorganization," a shareholder of a corporation which
is a party to the reorganization receives non-preferred stock in an-
other corporation which is also party to the reorganization, the share-
holder-recipient recognizes no gain even though he is not forced to
surrender any stock unless
(A) any corporation which is party to such reorganization was not
intended to continue the active conduct of a trade or business
after such reorganization, or
(B) the corporation whose stock is distributed was used principally
15 The Supreme Court opinion in Gregory has since been cited for a multitude of
propositions, many of which have no necessary relation to spin-offs or bailouts.
Nonetheless, the importance of the bailout device in the Gregory setting cannot be
overemphasized in understanding the legislative scheme and judicial approach to spin-
offs under the 1954 Code.
16 The business purpose doctrine is discussed at notes 96-116 infra and accompanying
text.
17 Treas. Reg. 86, Art. 112 (g)-5 (1935); H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934),
reprinted in 1939-1 (Part 2) CuM. BuLL. 554, 564. The method chosen to accomplish
this result was to eliminate the tax-free spin-off provision, Revenue Act of 1932, ch.
209, § 112 (g), 47 Stat. 197, from the act. See generally BrrrsnR, FEDERAL INCOME TAXA-
TON OF CO5.ORATIONS AND SHaRMOLDERS 322-28 (1959); Jacobs, supra note 12, at 157-
67.
"See, e.g., Chester E. Spangler, 18 T.C. 976 (1952).
"See authorities cited note 48 infra.
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as a device for the distribution of earnings and profits to the share-
holders of any corporation a party to the reorganization.
20
Only the separation of assets associated with the conduct of an active
business could be spun off, while the tax-free separation of an exist-
ing corporation into active and inactive entities was prohibited.
SECTION 355
In large measure the 1951 legislation is important because the
general restrictions which it imposed on spin-offs--the active business
test and the device clause-serve as the cornerstones of the 1954 Code
treatment which imposed the following prerequisites for a tax-free
corporate separation:
1. Stock of a "controlled" corporation must be distributed.21
2. The spin-off must not be used principally as a device for dis-
tributing the earnings of the distributing or controlled corporation.
22
3. Immediately after the distribution both the distributing and
controlled corporations must be engaged in the active conduct of a
trade or business.2 3
4. The business of both the distributing and controlled corpora-
tions must satisfy the five-year business history rules.
24
5. Generally, the distributing corporation must distribute all
of the stock and securities which it owns in the' controlled corpora-
tion. 25
2 0 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 112 (b) (11), added by ch. 521, § 317 (a) (11), 65 Stat. 493
(1951).2
" INT. RFV. CODE OF 1954, § 355 (a) (1) (A). Control is defined in § 368 (c) to mean
the ownership of stock possessing at least eighty per cent of the total combined voting
power of all classes of stock entitled to vote and at least eighty per cent of the total
number of shares of all other classes of stock of the corporation. See Rev. Rul. 59-259,
1959-2 Cum. BuLT. 115, which holds that control means the ownership of stock possess-
ing at least eighty per cent of the total combined voting of all classes of voting
stock and the ownership of at least eighty per cent of the total number of shares of
each class of nonvoting stock.2 2 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 355 (a) (I) (B).
2
3 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 355 (b) (1).
,4 INT. REv. CoDF or 1954, § 355 (b) (2).
25 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 355 (a) (1) (D). All of the stock in the controlled
corporation must be distributed unless the Commissioner is satisfied that the retention
of stock in the controlled corporation is not pursuant to a plan of tax avoidance. Ibid.
Presumably, retention of some shares to satisfy state law requirements regarding corpo-
rate names or compliance wtih employee stock option plans is permitted. Retention of
shares acquired within five years which would constitute taxable boot to the share-
holders under §§ 355 (a) (2) and 356 (a) is not likely to win the Commissioner's favor.
Query: What if the reason for the retention is to allow the officers and directors of the
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(1) Distributing the Stock of a Controlled Corporation. Under
the 1954 Code the stock in a "controlled corporation" 26 may be dis-
tributed to a shareholder in a tax-free spin-off. The controlled corpo-
ration may be a pre-existing subsidiary of the distributing corporation
or, if the distributing corporation does not have a pre-existing con-
trolled corporation, it may transfer the assets to be spun off to a newly
created subsidiary and then distribute the stock of the new corpora-
tion ,to its shareholders. The latter type of section 355 distribution
is a reorganization under section 368 (a) (1) (D).27 In general, the
controlled corporation must have been controlled by the distributing
corporation for five years preceding the distribution, or control
must have been acquired in a nontaxable transaction, and in either
case, the control must not be illusory.28
(2) Device Test. The device test of section 355 is one of the
qualifications specifically aimed at preventing shareholders from
bailing out the earnings and profits of the corporation. Obviously,
when a shareholder receives the stock of a controlled corporation and
then sells the stock or liquidates one of the post-distribution corpora-
tions, he, in effect, converts corporate earnings into cash. The eco-
nomic effect of a stockholder's receiving property in this manner may
be equivalent to his receiving a dividend. Consequently, where a
distributing corporation to maintain effective control of the affairs of the controlled
corporation?
-
6 See definition of "controlled corporation" note 21 supra.
27 As indicated at note 6 supra and accompanying text, a corporate separation may
take any one of three forms-spin-off, split-off or split-up-and may be either pro rata
or non-pro-rata. INT. REV. CODE or 1954, § 355 (a) (1) (A) (ii) also accommodates the
distribution of stock in a controlled corporation to a security holder in exchange for
securities. Since the non-recognition of gain provisions of §§ 311 and 836 are not avail-
able to the distributing corporation in such cases, any gain (the difference between
the distributing corporation's adjusted basis for the stock in the controlled corpora-
tion and the amount of its indebtedness) on such exchanges would presumably have
to be recognized by the distributing corporation. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 61 (a)
(12). The exchanging security holders would, however, enjoy the tax-free treatment
accorded by § 355 (a).
28 In Rev. Rul. 63-260, 1963-2 Cum. BuL.. 147, "A owned all of the stock of X which
owned 70 shares of the stock of Y. A also owned the remaining 30 shares of Y stock di-
rectly. A contributed 10 shares of his Y stock to X. Immediately thereafter, X dis-
tributed all 80 shares of Y stock now held by it to A.
"Held, the distribution by X does not qualify ... under the provisions of section
855 ... because X did not have 'control' of Y... immediately before the distribution
except in a transitory and illusory sense." But see Rev. Rul. 56-117, 1956-1 Cum. BuLL.
180, where a recapitalization of the controlled corporation, immediately prior to the
distribution, gave the distributing corporation "control," only long enough for it to
distribute the stock of the controlled corporation in a non-pro-rata split-off.
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sale or liquidation of one of the corporations is arranged prior to the
spin-off, the spin-off will ordinarily be treated as a device to distribute
earnings and profits which will deny the benefits of section 355 to
the shareholders.2 Such a sale is prearranged if enforceable rights
to buy or to sell existed before the spin-off or if all the facts and
circumstances indicate an arrangement had been negotiated. 0 Read
literally, the statute appears to deny section 355 benefits to any spin-
off which is part of a prearranged plan to sell or liquidate one of the
participating corporations even though there is no actual conversion
of dividend income to capital gain. Moreover, where a sale is made
after the spin-off-although it is not pursuant to a previously negoti-
ated arrangement-it may still be evidence that the spin-off was used
principally as a device.3' However, where the separation involves two
businesses which qualify for partial liquidation treatment under
section 346 (b), it has been argued that a split-off followed by a sale
of one of the corporations by the shareholders should not be treated
as a device.3 2
The foregoing discussion pertains to transfers by shareholders
which remove, earnings and profits from "corporate solution" and
effect a bailout. Arguments for a similar restriction on alienation of
the stock of either of the post-distribution corporations may be ad-
vanced even where there is no withdrawal of assets from "corporate
solution" and no conversion of dividend income. Such a situation
arises where the acquiring corporation in a reorganization does not
wish to acquire all of the assets of the acquired corporation and there-
fore chooses to have the acquired corporation distribute the un-
wanted assets to its shareholders via a tax-free spin-off. But this pro-
cedure runs the double risk of having either the spin-off or the re-
organization fail to satisfy the requirements for tax-free treatment. 33
2 9 In Rev. Rul. 55-103, 1955-1 CuM. BULL. 31, X corporation, which owned eighty
per cent of the stock of Y corporation, proposed to spin-off the Y corporation stock to
the shareholders of X, immediately prior to their sale of X stock to Z corporation.
Held, the distribution of the Y stock did not qualify under § 355 since the distribution
was a device for the distribution of X's earnings to its shareholders. But see Rev. Rul.
59-197, 1959-1 Cum. BULL. 77, where a sale of stock by a shareholder immediately be-
fore a non-pro-rata split-off (which had the same effect as a sale after the split-off)
pursuant to a previously negotiated agreement was held not to constitute a device
under the particular facts.
80 Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2 (b) (2) (1955).
8 1 Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2 (b) (1) (1955).
32E.g., Lipnick, Nontaxable Corporate Liquidations, 2 HousrON L. REv. 344, 361
(1965); see Jacobs, supra note 12, at 170.
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A spin-off followed by a prearranged reorganization might fail to
satisfy the requirements of section 355 where the shareholders of the
predistribution corporation do not control both of the post-distribu-
tion corporations. Section 368 (a) (1) (D), which provides for one of
the two forms a spin-off may take, requires that the distributing
corporation's shareholders (or former shareholders in the case of a
non-pro-rata separation) must control the controlled corporation after
the separation. If control is relinquished through a prearranged re-
organization with another unrelated corporation, can it be said that
a D reorganization (including the section 355 distribution) has been
effected? But, even assuming that there is no D reorganization,
should the transaction be treated as a section 351 exchange followed
by a section 355 distribution? Under the 1939 Code3 4 a spin-off must
have been pursuant to a reorganization, and the reorganization pro-
visions required that the shareholders of the distributing corporation
must have controlled the controlled corporation after the spin-
off. Where the shareholders had contracted to divest themselves of
control prior to the reorganization, the control requirements were
not satisfied.3 5 Although Congress, in the 1954 Code, eliminated this
reorganization requirement in corporate separation cases, 36 there is
no expression of congressional intent regarding the question of
whether it also intended to relax the strict control requirements im-
posed by the D reorganization provision of the 1939 Code. It is
questionable whether spin-offs utilizing pre-existing corporations
should be held to any lesser standards than spin-offs consummated
by a D reorganization.
In Curtis v. United States,37 the Sixth Circuit held that a spin-off
followed by a prearranged statutory merger of the distributing corpo-
ration into an unrelated corporation, did not qualify under section
355 on the grounds that the distributing corporation did not con-
tinue in the active conduct of business after the spin-off. The court
left unanswered the question of whether it would have reached the
11 See Helvering v. Elkhorn Coal Co., 95 F.2d 732 (4th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 805
U.S. 605 (1938). "Substantially all of the properties" requirement of § 368 (a) (1) (C) is
not complied with when a substantial amount of unwanted assets are spun off prior
to a prearranged acquisition. 95 F.2d at 735.
8, Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 112(b) (11), added by ch. 521, 65 Stat. 493 (1951).
"' Compare Scientific Instrument Co., 17 T.C. 1253 (1952), aff'd per curiam, 202
F.2d 155 (6th Cir. 1953).
n1 S. RFx. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 50, 266 (1954).
37 336 F.2d 714 (6th Cir. 1964), affirming 215 F. Supp. 885 (N.D. Ohio 1963).
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same result had the distributing corporation been the surviving
corporation in the merger. In Mary Archer W. Morris Trust,8 the
Tax Court held that a plan which called for a bank to spin off its
insurance business and then consolidate with another bank qualified
under section 355. The Tax Court distinguished Curtis on the
grounds that the distributing bank in Morris Trust was deemed to
have continued its banking business under the National Banking Act
provisions whereas the distributing corporation in Curtis did not
continue in business, since it was absorbed in the merger. This
distinction was rejected by the Fourth Circuit in its affirmance of
Morris Trust. The court of appeals held that the reorganization
subsequent to the spin-off did not' effect a discontinuance of the
distributing corporation's banking business; that it made no differ-
ence whether the distributing corporation or the other party to the
reorganization was the surviving corporation in the reorganization;
that amalgamating reorganizations consummated subsequent to
spin-offs will not impair the tax-free status of spin-offs even where
the shareholders of the distributing corporation fail to retain control
of the amalgamated corporation; and that while the National Bank-
ing Act did not continue the identity of the distributing corporation
for federal tax purposes, if under any state or federal merger statute
there is, in fact, substantive continuity of each constituent and its
business, the requirements of section 355 are satisfied. The Fourth
Circuit's opinion in Morris Trust leaves no doubt as to the conflict
that now exists between the Fourth and Sixth Circuits.
One of the factors employed to determine whether a particular
spin-off is a device to distribute earnings is the percentage of active
business assets of each of the post-distribution corporations. If sub-
stantially all of the assets of each of the corporations are, and have
been, used in the active conduct of business, an inference arises that
the spin-off was not used principally as a device.39 If only a small
percentage of the corporation's assets consists of business assets, as
opposed to investment assets, a contrary, but rebuttable, inference is
created. Generally, the non-business assets of the distributing corpo-
ration and of the controlled corporation should constitute less than
half of the corporation's assets if the device inference is to be over-
42 T.C. 779 (1964), aff'd, 367 F.2d 794 (4th Cir. 1966).
"Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2 (b) (3) (1955).
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come.40 For this purpose, however, it would appear that busiiess
assets associated with a business less than five years old would nor-
mally be deemed business assets, rather than non-business or invest-
ment assets. Accordingly, a recently purchased business could be
spun off if the controlled corporation conducted a qualifying active
business in addition to the purchased business. These observations
apply equally to the asset and business composition of both the dis-
tributing and the controlled corporation.
In contrast, Revenue Ruling 64-10241 held that a non-pro-rata
split-off passed the device test even though less than fifty per cent of
the assets were active business assets. Since a shareholder who par-
ticipates in a completely non-pro-rata split-off could, in most cases,
qualify for capital gain treatment under section 302 (b), the non-pro-
rata split-off generally is said not to be a device to distribute earnings
at capital gain rates.
Since one of the purposes of the device test is to prevent the sub-
stitution of tax-free distributions of stock in the controlled corpora-
tion for taxable dividends, would a distribution which meets all of
the other tests of section 355 qualify if the business of the distributed
controlled corporation is so small in relation to the size of the dis-
tributing corporation that it appears more like a dividend than a
separation of two businesses? Could a corporation which conducts
two businesses, one with assets of 1 billion dollars and an annual
income of 300 million dollars, the other with assets of 50,000 dollars
and an annual income of 15,000 dollars, spin off the smaller business?
Although there have been no rulings or cases on this question, it
would seem that the answer would depend upon whether the busi-
ness reasons motivating the corporate separation are sufficiently co-
gent. If a large distributing corporation were systematically to dis-
tribute the stock of small controlled corporations to its shareholders,
it would appear that the device clause could be successfully invoked
by the Commissioner.
In every case involving the separation of two or more businesses,
particularly where there is to be a non-pro-rata division, taxpayers
are confronted with the problem of "equalizing" the corporations.
10 An interesting problem is presented where non-business assets constitute more
than fifty per cent of the value of both the distributing corporation and the controlled
corporation. In such a case, it would appear necessary to present substantial proof
of the absence of a device and cogent business reasons for the separation if the device
inference is to be rebutted.
12 1964-1 (Part I) Cus.. BuLL. 156.
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For example, a corporation owned equally by two stockholders is
engaged in the furniture and appliance business. Because of per-
sonal and business differences, the stockholders plan to transfer the
assets of the existing corporation to two new corporations, one to be
owned by each of the shareholders. The value of the furniture busi-
ness exceeds the value of the appliance business. To equalize the
two businesses, cash previously used in the furniture business is
transferred to the appliance corporation. The transfer of the cash
necessary to equalize the value of the two corporations is not a device
to distribute earnings and will not impede a tax-free split-up.4 2 But
if the cash contribution to the controlled corporation constitutes a
substantial part of the controlled corporation's net worth and is not
an essential ingredient of a non-tax-motivated plan, such as an equali-
zation of values prior to a non-pro-rata separation, the Service may
deem the contribution a device for the distribution of earnings. 43
A third type of cash contribution should be mentioned briefly,
even though its importance is not in the device area of section 355.
In the example of the two shareholders who owned the corporation
which conducted the furniture and appliance business, let us assume
that the corporation had no cash available to equalize the assets of
the two businesses. If the furniture business was worth 8,000 dollars
and the appliance business worth 4,000 dollars, could the tax-free
separation be accomplished by:
(I) Placing the furniture business in a controlled corporation
and distributing its stock to shareholder A in exchange for his stock
in the distributing corporation and 2,000 dollars; or by
(2) Shareholder A's purchasing 2,000 dollars of stock in the
distributing corporation from shareholder B and then exchanging
his 8,000 dollars worth of stock in the distributing corporation for the
8,000 dollars worth of stock in the controlled corporation?
Section 355 (a) (1) (A) requires that the distribution of stock in
the controlled corporation must be with respect to stock. If cash
rather than stock constitutes more than twenty per cent of the con-
sideration for the distribution of the stock of the controlled corpora-
tion, the distributing corporation may be deemed not to have dis-
tributed "with respect to its stock" an amount of stock constituting
2 Rev. Rul. 56-655, 1956-2 CuM. BuLL. 214.
" Rev. Rul. 64-102, 1964-1 (Part 1) CuM. BuLL. 136; Rev. Rul. 58-68, 1958-1 CuM.
BULL. 183.
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control of the controlled corporation as provided in section 368 (a)
(1) (D).44 Accordingly, since twenty-five per cent of the considera-
tion for the furniture business stock (2,000/8,000) is cash, only
seventy-five per cent of the stock may be deemed to have been dis-
tributed with respect to A's appliance stock. The second alternative
would require shareholder B to recognize gain or loss on the 2,000
dollars received for the shares sold to A .45
(3) Active Business Requirements. Section 355 (b) (1) requires,
in general, that both the distributing corporation and the controlled
corporation must be engaged in the active conduct of a trade or busi-
ness immediately after the distribution. Section 355 (b) (2) defines
the active conduct of a trade or business for this purpose. The first
requirement is that each of the post-distribution corporations must
be engaged in the active conduct of a trade or business. 46 The ques-
tion of what constitutes the active conduct of a trade or business
within the meaning of, section 355 continues to be troublesome for
both taxpayers and the Treasury.
The Revenue Act of 1951,47 which restored tax-free spin-offs to
the code, required that the tax-free spin-off be limited to situations
"in which all of the new corporations as well as the present are in-
tended to carry on a business after the reorganization." 4 The Senate
Finance Committee in 1954 characterized section 355 as "not per-
mitting the tax-free separation of an existing corporation into active
and inactive entities . . . -49 With this background, it is not sur-
prising that holding stock, securities, land, or other property for in-
"But see Oscar E. Baan, 45 T.C. 71 (1965) (on appeal to 2d and 9th circuits) (spin-
off approved in transaction where rights and cash were exchanged for stock in the con-
trolled corporation).
5 In Rev. Rul. 59-197, 1959-1 CuM. BULL. 77, a sale of some shares from B to A
prior to a non-pro-rata split-off was approved by the Service. The ruling carefully notes
the unique facts which allowed the Service to rule that the sale and split-off were not
a device to distribute earnings.
46 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 355 (b) (2) (A). This section also accommodates holding
companies substantially all of the assets of which, immediately after the distribution,
consist of stock and securities of a controlled corporation which is engaged in an active
business.
47 Ch. 521, 65 Stat. 452.
18 S. REP. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 58 (1951), reprinted in 1951-2 Cum. BULtL
458, 499. See also 96 CONG. REc. 18685 (1950) (remarks of Senator Humphrey) (sec-
tion 206 (a) of the Senate fFinance Committee Bill, which in the 1951 Act became
§ 112 (b) (11) of the 1939 Code, was designed to prevent stockholders from converting
dividends to capital gain by limiting spin-offs to corporations intended to carry on
active businesses).
'9S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1954).
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vestment or trading purposes does not constitute the active conduct
of a trade or business. 50
One of the difficulties frequently encountered is the determina-
tion of whether a corporate activity should be characterized as an
investment or as an active business. For example, assume that a
department store corporation has accumulated a substantial surplus
and cash reserves. The corporation then establishes a separate
department which manages its large securities portfolio. Assume
further that the department actively trades the securities. After com-
pleting the requisite five-year incubating period of section 355 (b)
(2) (C), can the "investment trading business" be spun off? Section
1.355-1 (c) (1) of the regulations indicates that it cannot. The con-
tinuous sales on a daily basis are probably insufficient to convert
the investment activities associated with these securities into an active
business. No amount of "managing" or other investment activity
will change the inherent investment character of these security hold-
ings. Presumably, the department store corporation is not a dealer in
securities. Consequently, gains and losses realized upon the dis-
position of the stocks result in capital, rather than ordinary, gain or
loss.52 Should it make any difference if the department store is a
dealer and the sales produce ordinary income?
If the investment department of the department store corporation
speculates in real estate, rather than stocks and bonds, a different
result may be indicated. Seemingly, if.the corporation purchases,
develops, and sells real property on a recurring basis, the activities
qualify as an active business. The real estate in the corporation's
portfolio, unlike securities, would probably be inventory or property
held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of busi-
ness. If so, any gain derived from property sales would be ordinary
income. Is this the distinction that allows a corporation to spin off
a real estate trading activity, but not a stock-trading activity? Since
the active business requirements of section 355 are not directed to
capital gain considerations, the answer should be no. But can the
10 Rev. Rul. 66-204, 1966 INT. Rxv. BuLL. No. 29, at 14.
51 The taxpayer in this example, in addition to his spin-off problems, may be con-
fronted with even greater accumulated earnings tax problems. See IN;T. REV. CODE OF
1954, §§ 531-37.
52 Compare INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1221 (gains and losses derived by a trader in
securities result in capital gains) with INT. R~v. CODE OF 1954, § 1236 (gains and losses
derived by a dealer in securities, other than on investments, result in ordinary income
and loss).
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capital gain v. ordinary income principles be forgotten when one ad-
dresses himself to resolving investment activities v. active business
questions?
Assuming that the department store's stock market activities fail
to satisfy the active business tests of section 355, should we reach a
similar answer in the case of a mutual fund (a regulated investment
company) which desires to divide its "business" in half? Should
trading in stocks and bonds be deemed only an investment activity
of a dealer in securities such as an investment banking firm?
Activities relating to the ownership and management of real
estate present some of the most troubling questions in the investment
v. active business analysis. Minimal real estate activities may con-
stitute a trade or business for many tax purposes,53 but they do not
necessarily constitute the active conduct of a trade or business re-
quired by section 355. Where real estate is leased to a tenant on a
"net lease" basis, that is, under terms where the tenant is responsible
for such items as taxes, insurance, and repairs in addition to specified
rentals, the absence of substantial landlord activity may fail to satisfy
the "active conduct" requirement of section 355. Similarly, if sub-
stantially all of the real estate activities-leasing, contracting for re-
pairs, and maintenance-are conducted by an independent contrac-
tor (for example, a real estate management company), rather than by
an employee of the owning real estate corporation, the corporation is
arguably not properly regarded as being engaged in the active con-
duct of a real estate business.
The distinctions between the passive ownership of real estate
investments and the active conduct of a real estate business are some-
times fine indeed.54 If an employee of a corporation which owns a
shopping center performs all those activities required, the corpora-
tion is probably actively conducting a real estate business. It would
appear irrelevant that these activities-collecting rent; paying in-
surance, taxes, and other bills; leasing space; contracting for main-
tenance and snow removal services-require only a few hours each
month. If these activities are all that the efficient operation of the
58 See, e.g., John D. Fackler, 45 B.T.A. 708 (1941), aff'd, 133 F.2d 509 (6th Cir. 1942)
(the subleasing of a lease on a single building constitutes a trade or business for pur-
poses of depreciation under the predecessor of § 167); Leland Hazard, 7 T.C. 372' (1946)
(renting a former residence is a trade or business).
'Cf. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §856, which makes a similar distinction for real
estate investment trusts.
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shopping center requires, perhaps section 355 should require no
more.
Where a corporation uses a major portion of its real property
in one of its principal trades or businesses, the ownership and opera-
tion of the real estate does not constitute the active conduct of a
trade or business. 55 In view of the legislative background of the en-
actment of section 355 in 1954, the ownership of real estate by a
subsidiary leased to and used.in the parent's primary business should
fare no better.5 6
In addition to the problems associated with determining whether
a corporation's activities satisfy the "active" requirements of the
active business test, it sometimes is necessary to determine what
"business" the corporation has conducted. On at least one occasion
the Service was confronted with the problem of characterizing the
type of business engaged in by a corporation.57 Corporation A had
been in the business of selling and servicing Brand X automobiles in
two locations for more than five years. In 1954 A acquired the
franchise to sell and service Brand Y automobiles. All of the Brand
X activities were moved to location one; all the Brand Y activities
5 Treas. Reg. § 1.355-1 (c) (1955).
50 Section 353 (c) of H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954) contained the corporate
separation provisions. Tax-free spin-offs were sanctioned only when certain require-
ments, including the maintenance of separate books and records for the spun-off
business, were complied with. The Senate rejected the House proposal in favor of
existing law which prohibited "the tax-free separation of an existing corporation into
active and inactive entities." S. Rr. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1954). It may
be questioned whether the renting of property to a related corporation can ever be
deemed an active business as envisioned by the framers of § 355. Even the House bill
denied active business status to corporate businesses which derived ten per cent or more
of their gross income from personal-holding-company-type sources. Surprisingly, the
courts have not yet clearly stated whether renting real estate to a related corporation
can qualify as an active business under the 1954 Code. See Isabel A. Elliott, 32 T.C.
283, 290 (1959), where the Commissioner did not contest the petitioner's contention
that a corporation was engaged in the active conduct of a real estate business which
leased the major portion of its property to its parent corporation. The Commissioner's
position in Elliott did not require him to contest this point. In Albert W. Badanes, 39
T.C. 410 (1962), the Commissioner stipulated that a real estate corporation that leased
a bottling plant to its sister corporation was actively engaged in the real estate business.
Stipulation (para. 12), Brief for Petitioner in Reply, p. 3. But see Bonsall v. Com-
missioner, 317 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1963), holding that a spin-off and leaseback of buildings
used in a linoleum business did not meet the five-year active business tests of § 355 (b)
(2) (B).
Under the 1939 Code, leasing property to related corporations apparently satisfied
the active business tests. See Estate of Parshelsky v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d 14 (2d Cir.
1962), on remand, 32 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1036 (1963); Bondy V. Commissioner, 269
F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1959); Wilkins v. United States, 188 F. Supp. 91 (S.D. II. 1960).
5' Rev. Rul. 57-190, 1957-1 CuM. BULL. 121.
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were moved to location two. In 1956, the Brand X activities were
placed in controlled corporatioi X and the stock was spun off to the
A shareholders. The question was whether the distributing corpora-
tion had been actively conducting its business for five years prior
to the distribution. If one were to seek the answer by viewing the
distributing corporation's activities in a generic sense, it seems clear
that an automobile sales and service business had been conducted
for five years. But the Service found two separate businesses-selling
and servicing Brand X automobiles; and selling and servicing Brand
Y automobiles. Accordingly, Revenue Ruling 57-190 held that the
Brand Y sales and service acquired by purchase in 1954 was less
than five years old in 1956.
Unfortunately, much of the uncertainty which pervades the
definitional problems associated with the active conduct of a trade
or business can be expected to remain until the courts have had
an opportunity to pass on a number of varied situations. A sub-
stantial number of these cases will probably arise in litigation in-
volving the five-year history rule.
(4) The Five-Year Business History Rule. Section '55 (b) (2) (B)
requires that the trade or business actively conducted by the dis-
tributing corporation after the spin-off must have been actively con-
ducted for five years preceding the distribution. The same rule is
applicable to the business of the controlled corporation.
The business must not have been acquired directly or indirectly
by either of the post-distribution corporations within five years of
the distribution in a transaction in which gain or loss was recog-
nized.58 Unfortunately, neither the code nor the regulations are as
clear on this point as one would desire. The purpose of the pro-
vision requiring that the business distributed may not have been
acquired in a taxable transaction within five years is readily appreci-
ated. Congress sought to limit the potential abuse of the spin-off
provisions by limiting their benefits to distributions of well-estab-
lished (five-year old) businesses. If a new business desired by one
or more shareholders could be distributed tax-free, the bailout
potential would be immeasurably increased. Only the limitations
of the device clause and the problem of locating a willing buyer would
stand between the shareholder and the receipt of corporate earnings
"a INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 355 (b) (2) (C), (D).
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
at capital gain rates. As in the case of partial liquidations, Congress
felt that if a corporation had to conduct a business actively for five
years prior to distributing it to its shareholders, the opportunities for
abuse would be effectively contained. Under section 355 a corpora-
tion cannot use its excess funds to purchase a business and then dis-
tribute the business to its shareholders, who could in turn sell the
business to a willing purchaser.
The corporation can, however, 'acquire a business with its stock
in a tax-free reorganization and distribute the acquired business to its
shareholders, if no gain or loss was recognized in the reorganization
transaction. 9 Since the acquiring corporation never recognizes any
gain in a reorganization, 60 the reference to gain or loss must be read
as applying to the "seller." Thus, if boot is paid in a reorganization,
the distribution of the acquired business within five years of its
acquisition will not qualify under section 355. 61 It is questionable
whether such a strict rule furthers the purpose of the five-year re-
quirement. If the acquisition of the business meets the continuity-of-
interest requirements of a tax-free reorganization, even if some of the
boot given in the transaction results in a recognition of gain to a
transferor corporation under section 361 or to its shareholders under
section 356, why should section 355 treat the acquisition exactly the
same as if the business had been purchased for cash? If Congress
intended to deny section 355 benefits to distributions of businesses
acquired in essentially tax-free acquisitions within five years of a dis-
tribution, its judgment may be questioned. Conversely, the pro-
priety of applying the limitations of section 355 (b) (2) (C) to certain
cash acquisitions where gain is fortuitously not recognized is almost
beyond question. Frequently, the basis for stock owned by a de-
cedent at the time of his death is determined by its sales price. If a
corporation purchases such stock, no gain or loss is recognized by
either the buyer or the seller,62 but no good reason exists for allowing
the tax-free distribution of the acquired stock until five years have
59 See ibid.
"0 INT. REv. CODE oF 1954, § 1032.
61 See BTFrrER, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 337
(1959).
62 For purposes of applying § 355 (b) (2) (C), a better view might be to regard the sale
of such stock as resulting in the recognition of gain, but since the basis of the stock under
§ 1014 is equal to the sales price, the amount recognized under § 1001 is zero. Such an
analysis would seem to further the intent of § 355 without doing violence to the statutory
language.
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elapsed. Similarly, a corporation which fulfills the requirements of
section 337 may sell a business to the distributing corporation for
cash. Again, neither the buyer nor the seller recognizes any gain
on the transaction. But here, the acquisition transaction could con-
ceivably be deemed a taxable one since the shareholders will recog-
nize gain or loss on the liquidation of the selling corporation. The
Service can be expected to deny section 355 benefits to all distribu-
tions involving gain, including reorganization boot, as well as to
purchases by the distributing corporation at the seller's basis and to
purchases from corporations which are in the process of complete
liquidation and which have obtained the benefits of section 387.
Only a few cases have explored the application of the no-gain-or-
loss requirements of section 355 (b) (2) (C). In Gabriel Fabrication
Co.,63 W. E. Gabriel and his brother were the principal shareholders
of Boiler Corporation, which had for more than five years conducted
three businesses. The brothers agreed to separate their business
interests. Before arrangements for a split-off could be completed, the
brothers agreed between themselves to divide Boiler. The assets of
two of the businesses were "loaned" to one of the stockholders, W. E.
Gabriel, who operated the businesses for fourteen months as a sole
proprietor. Then, legal title to the assets was transferred by Boiler
to its subsidiary, Engineering, the stock of which was distributed to
Gabriel in exchange for his Boiler stock.
In Gabriel, the Commissioner argued that the five-year history
rule of section 355 required that the business of the controlled corpo-
rations must have been conducted by the distributing corporation or
the controlled corporation for the full five-year period preceding the
distribution. The court, however, held for the taxpayer, noting that
neither the code nor the regulations require that the business con-
ducted during the five-year period shall have been conducted by
either the distributing or the controlled corporation. Since the
business could have been conducted by a stranger during most of
the period, so long as its acquisition by the distributing corporation
was tax-free, the court saw no reason why the conduct of the business
by Gabriel should receive less favorable treatment.
Although the Tax Court in Gabriel acknowledged difficulty in
discerning the specific congressional purpose for enacting section
68 42 T.C. 545 (1964), acq. 1965-1 Cum. BUL.. 4.
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355 (b) (2) (C), it quoted the following analysis from an article by
Cohen, Silverman, Surrey, Tarlea, and Warren 4 with apparent
approval: 65
This requirement [355 (b) (2)(C)] is apparently intended to
prevent temporary purchases of going businesses as a method of
distributing liquid assets to shareholders. Accordingly, the test has
the general purpose of differentiating between acquisitions for cash
or other liquid assets, which will not qualify, and acquisitions for
stock, which will qualify.68
Since the businesses involved in Gabriel were not acquired by Boiler
or Engineering for cash or other liquid assets within five years, the
Tax Court's holding appears correct. Had the loan of the business
assets to Gabriel or their return to Boiler been deemed a taxable
transaction, however, a contrary result would appear inevitable.
Section 355 (b) (2) (C) requires that the business conducted by the
controlled corporation after the spin-off must not have been acquired
within five years in a transaction in which gain or loss was recognized
in whole or in part. Section 1.3554 (b) (1) of the regulations pro-
vides that gain or loss must not have been recognized when the busi-
ness was acquired by either the distributing corporation or the con-
trolled corporation. Thus, if a corporation transfers a business to
a newly formed controlled corporation in exchange for all of the
stock of the controlled corporation and other property (for example,
a short-term note), any gain to the transferor corporation on the ex-
change will be recognized under the provisions of section 351 (b).
Accordingly, a distribution of the stock of the controlled corporation
within five years will not satisfy the requirements of section 355 (b)
(2) (C).
In Oscar E. Baan67 the distributing corporation, Pacific Tele-
phone & Telegraph Co. ("Pacific") transferred its telephone business
located in several northwestern states to a newly formed controlled
corporation, Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Co. ("Northwest") in
exchange for all of Northwest's stock and a 200 million-dollar note.
68 Cohen, Silverman, Surrey, Tarleau & Warren, The Internal Revenue Code of 1954:
Corporate Distributions, Organizations, and Reorganizations, 68 HARv. L. REV. 593
(1955).
65 42 T.C. at 557.
86 Cohen, Silverman, Surrey, Tarleau & Warren, supra note 64, at 430; see dis-
cussion by the court in Gabriel, 42 T.C. at 563.
6745 T.C. 71 (1965) (on appeal to the 2d and 9th Circuits).
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The Commissioner determined that the note was other property, 68
and thus concluded that the controlled corporation had acquired its
business in a transaction in which gain or loss had been recognized
within the prohibited five-year period. During 1961, the year in
which the described exchange transaction was consummated, both
Pacific and Northwest were subsidiaries of American Telephone 8C
Telegraph Co. and joined with it in the filing of a consolidated re-
turn. Thus, the gain resulting from the transfer of the business
assets which might have otherwise been subject to tax was eliminated
from the then applicable consolidated return regulations.69 The
Commissioner, while conceding that the gain was eliminated under
the consolidated return regulations, argued that since the gain was
"recognized" under section 351 (b), Northwest did not acquire its
business in a transaction in which gain was not recognized within the
prohibited five-year period. The Tax Court held that the elim-
ination of gain or loss under the consolidated return regulations
satisfied the no-recognition-of-gain-or-loss requirement of section
355 (b) (2) (C). The ultimate resolution of this issue in Baan can
have a significant effect on the tax status of many spin-offs involving
affiliated groups which have filed consolidated returns within five
years of the separation."
(5) Distribution of All Stock and Securities. Section 355 (a)
(1) (D) requires that the distributing corporation must either (1)
"SThe taxpayers argued that the note was a security, which like stock, can be
received without the recognition of gain under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 351 (a). Since
the court found that no gain would be recognized in any event because of the consoli-
dated return regulations, it was unnecessary to determine whether the note was, in
fact, boot. 45 T.C. at 92.
" Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-31 (b) (1) (1955). For treatment under the new consolidated
return regulations, see Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-13 (h), Example (2) (1966).
,o The new consolidated return regulations provide that intercompany exchanges
result in a recognition of gain to the exchanging parties, but the gain is deferred until
a subsequent event. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-13 (1966). In view of the significantly differ-
ent treatment accorded exchanges under the old and new consolidated return regula-
tions, it is questionable whether the Tax Court would reach the same result as it did
in Baan in a case governed by the new regulations.
A distributing corporation may acquire control of the controlled corporation in a
taxable transaction, within the prohibited five-year period, even though the distributing
corporation was not a party to the transaction. Assume that P corporation owns
seventy-five per cent of the stock of S corporation. In the current year S redeems
the twenty-five per cent stock interests owned by the minority shareholders. The
redemption is a transaction in which gain or loss is recognized by the redeeming share-
holders and is the transaction by which P obtained control of S. Consequently, P
cannot distribute the S stock under § 355 until five years after the date of the redemp-
tion. Rev. Rul. 57-144, 1957-1 CuM. BuLL. 123.
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distribute all of its stock and securities in the controlled corporation;
or (2) distribute at least enough stock to constitute "control," as
defined in section 368 (c) (1),71 and must establish to the satisfaction
of the Commissioner that the stock and securities not distributed
were not retained in pursuance of a plan of tax avoidance. Gen-
erally, all the stock and securities of the controlled corporation must
be distributed, even though their distribution may result in the
shareholder receiving taxable boot.72
SPLrITING A SINGLE BUSINESS
A corporation is engaged in the active conduct of a trade or
business if a specific group of activities are being carried on by such
corporation for the purpose of earning income or profit from such
group of activities, and the activities included in such group include
every operation which forms a part of, or a step in, the process of
earning income or profit from such group.78
Section 355 (b) (1) requires that each post-distribution business
must be actively conducted immediately after the distribution-a
post-distribution two-business rule. Section 355 (b) (2) (B) requires
that each of the post-distribution businesses must have been "actively
conducted throughout the 5-year period ending on the date of the
distribution." .The regulations74 provide that the active business
and the five-year history requirements are satisfied only when there
are two separate trades or businesses, each with a five-year history,
immediately prior to the distribution. The regulations are based
on the argument that the term "such trade or business" in section
355 (b) (2) (B) refers to the active conduct of the same trade or busi-
ness for five years prior to the distribution. Since two businesses are
required after the separation by virtue of the post-distribution
rules of section 355 (b) (1), the regulations require that there must
n "For purposes of Part I (other than section 304), Part II and this part, the term
'control' means the ownership of stock possessing at least 80 per cent of the total com-
bined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote and at least 80 per cent of
the total number of shares of all other classes of stock of the corporation." INT. Rjtv.
CODE OF 1954, § 368 (c) (1).
72 Any stock of a controlled corporation which was acquired within five years of the
distribution in a transaction in which gain or loss was recognized will be boot when
distributed. See INT. REV. CODE oF 1954, § ,55 (a) (3); Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2 (f) (1)
(1955).
73 See Treas. Reg. § 1.355-1 (c) (1955).
71 Treas. Reg. §§ 1.355-1, -4 (1955).
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have been two businesses prior to separation. The present regula-
tions reason that where there is only one business prior to distribu-
tion it may not be separated tax-free, because each of the two resulting
businesses differs from the one business from which it came. This is
true even though the assets and activities of the two post-distribution
businesses are the same as the assets and activities of the one pre-
distribution business. Since one-half or one part of a business is not
the same as the whole business, neither of the post-distribution
businesses satisfies the five-year history requirements of section
855 (b) (2) (B). Accordingly, a set of assets and activities constituting
a single business cannot be divided tax-free under the present regu-
lations.
In Edmund P. Coady,75 the two shareholders of a small construc-
tion company decided to divide their business. The division was to
be accomplished by a "vertical slice." Each of the post-distribution
corporations was to take approximately one-half of the pre-distribu-
tion corporation's assets and each corporation (after the split-off)
would perform all those activities forming a part of or a step in the
process of earning income from the construction business.
The Tax Court rejected the Commissioner's argument that the
distribution in Coady failed to meet the requirements of section 355.
The regulations, which supported the Commissioner's position, 7
were held invalid to the extent they provided that section 855 does not
apply to the division of a single business. The Tax Court concluded
that, although the statute requires two active businesses after the
distribution, each with a five-year history, it does not require that
each such trade or business necessarily must have been conducted
on an individual basis throughout the 5-year period. As long as
the trade or business which has been divided has been actively
conducted for 5 years preceding the distribution, and the resulting
businesses ... are actively conducted after the division, we are of
the opinion that the active business requirements of the statute
have been complied with.
There being no language, either in the statute or committee
report, which denies tax-free treatment under section 355 to a
transaction solely on the grounds that it represents an attempt
to divide a single trade or business, the Commissioner's regulations
7- 33 T.C. 771 (1960), aff'd, 289 F.2d 490 (6th Cir. 1961).
'1 Treas. Reg. § 1.355-1 (a) (1955).
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which impose such a restriction are invalid, and cannot be sus-
tained.77
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with this view in
United States v. Marett78 stating that the regulations' pre-distribution
two-business rule "is more than an attempt to put a 'gloss' on the
statutory requirement. It is an attempt to add a restriction to the
statute which is not there." 79 In Revenue Ruling 64-14780 the Ser-
vice- announced that it would follow Coady and Marett to the extent
that they hold that a single business may be divided under section
355 and that consideration would be given to a modification of the
regulations.
As of this writing, the new regulations have not been promul-
gated. Although one might initially think that the regulations could
be modified to conform with the Coady and Marett decisions simply
by deleting the objectionable sentence of section 1.355-1 (a) of the
regulations which prohibits the division of a single business, careful
study of the pre-distribution two-business rule contained in section
1.355-1 (c) of the regulations and illustrated by the examples in sec-
tion 1.355-1 (d) of the regulations discloses that the entire regulation
must be restructured if it is to conform with the court decisions.
In Coady and Marett there were "vertical splits" of a single
business; that is, each of the post-distribution corporations con-
ducted on a smaller scale the same business conducted by the single
predecessor corporation. In Coady, both post-distribution corpora-
tions were actively engaged in the construction business after the
split-off. In Marett, both of the post-spin-off corporations were en-
gaged in the manufacture and sale of edible pork skins.8 ' In order
to change the emphasis of the regulations from the discredited pre-
distribution two-business rule to a judicially acceptable post-distribu-
tion two-active-business rule (including the requisite five-year his-
77 33 T.C. at 778-79.Is 325 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1963).
79 Id. at S0.
80 1964-1 (Part 1) Cum. BuLL. 136.
"I The courts have not yet clearly ruled on the related question of whether § 355 is
also applicable to a "horizontal slicing" of a single vertically integrated business (e.g.,
the spin-off of the sales function or the warehousing function of an integrated manu-
facturer). But see Lockwood v. Commissioner, 350 F.2d 712 (8th Cir. 1965), which ap-
parently sanctioned the separation of a sales business from a manufacturing and sales
business.
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tory) it will be necessary to resolve the question of what assets and
activities constitute a trade or business with a five-year history.
A number of questions could be raised as to the types of divisions
of an integrated business that should receive tax-free treatment under
section 355. Take, for example, an integrated department store en-
terprise which has the following components: (1) a main downtown
store, (2) a suburban store, (3) a warehouse which stores goods only
for the enterprise, (4) delivery trucks which deliver goods only for
the enterprise, and (5) a parking lot, the use of which is free to
patrons of the downtown store. Under what circumstances, if any,
should the enterprise be permitted to spin off the suburban store?
The warehouse? The delivery trucks? The parking lot?
The foregoing questions, of course, present in its most simple form
the problem of what types of divisions are allowed by section 355.
Example 10 of the present regulations82 indicates that the downtown
store and the suburban store may constitute two separate businesses
within the meaning of section 355 under certain circumstances.
Example 10 indicates that in order for these two stores to be two
businesses, there must be separate management, separate purchasing,
and separate warehousing for each store.83 Since Coady apparently
makes it of no consequence whether the suburban store is a separate
department store business or part of a single department store busi-
ness, the suburban store could presumably be separated from the
downtown store under section 355.84 But just what assets must be
transferred to the controlled corporation to qualify as a trade or
business with a five-year history? Recalling that section 1.355-1 (c)
of the regulations requires that a post-distribution business consist
of a group of activities which includes every operation which forms
a part of, or a step in, the process of earning income or profit from
the group, it would appear that the department store corporation
conducts a number of activities-including warehousing, delivering,
and parking, as well as buying and selling merchandise-to produce a
single profit.
82 Treas. Reg. § 1.355-1 (d) (1955).
88 As to what constitutes a single business as opposed to two or more businesses, see
discussion of Lockwood and Burke in text accompanying notes 94-95 infra.
8, Note, however, the potential importance of the characterization of the suburban
store as a separate business or as a part of a single business, if the suburban store
(or the downtown store) has a history of less than five years. If they are separate
businesses, each must possess the requisite five-year history.
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Assuming for the moment that section 355 requires that any tax-
free division of a single business must be a "vertical slice," '5 how must
the assets be divided? If, for example, there is only one delivery
truck and only one warehouse, neither the truck nor the warehouse
is readily susceptible to an equal division between the two retail
outlets. The same could be said for the purchasing department if
it was composed of only one employee. Distributing one-half of the
downtown parking lot to the suburban store would be a fruitless, if
not a senseless act. It seems likely then that the revised regulations
must accept the fact that a perfect "vertical slice" is impractical in
many, if not most, corporate separations. The solution therefore
may be to allow the separation in situations where each of the two
post-distribution businesses conducts the same business (the depart-
ment store business) that was conducted by the single corporate pre-
decessor. As a matter of applying the philosophy of section 355 to
these cases, it would seem of little moment whether the suburban
store acquired a delivery truck in the corporate separation, purchased
a delivery truck with excess cash it received in the separation, con-
tracted with a local delivery service for future deliveries, or began a
new policy of no deliveries. Presumably, the warehouse and cus-
tomer parking facilities could be treated in a similar manner. The
important thing is that each of the two post-distribution corporations
would be engaged in the department store business after the separa-
tion.
Although we can anticipate with some assurance that the assets
and activities which constitute the retail suburban department store
business can be separated from the assets and activities which consti-
tute the retail downtown department store business, the fate of an
attempted separation of a warehouse, delivery trucks, or parking
lot operation, from a retail department store business is not so clear.
Unquestionably, after the distribution, a corporation which owns the
assets and conducts the activities formerly associated as a service arm
or function of the primary business is conducting a business. Equally
clear is the fact that the corporation which operates a warehouse is
not an inactive entity of the type which is denied the benefits of
'1 The Eighth Circuit has on one occasion indicated that the spun-off business must
be the same as the primary business of the distributing corporation. Lockwood v.
Commissioner, 350 F.2d 712, 718 (8th Cir. 1965) (dictum).
[Vol. 1967: 1
THE ANATOMY OF A SPIN-OFF
section 355.86 But is a corporation whose activities are limited to
servicing the primary business of the corporation from which it was
separated engaged in the active conduct of business as envisioned by
section 355? If so, does the warehousing business have the five-year
history required by section 355 (b) (2) (B)? The answers to these
questions depend upon whether the distributing retail department
store corporation is deemed to have ever been engaged in the ware-
housing business, and if so, whether that business has been actively
conducted for the requisite five-year period.
Assuming that the downtown department store has conducted
all of its activities for at least five years, the warehouse assets and
activities, which after the distribution service the department store,
apparently meet the definitional requirements of an active business
set forth in section 1.355-1 (c) of the regulations. But can it be
fairly said that the department store has ever been engaged in the
warehousing business for the requisite five-year period?
On balance it would seem that the warehousing business, the
delivery business, or the parking lot should qualify for separation
under section 355. The assets and activities which comprise the
business have been owned and conducted for the requisite period
and have earned income, at least in an economic sense, throughout
the period of operation. Further, the business purpose which moti-
vates the corporate separation (for example, an antitrust decree or
shareholder dispute) may require a horizontal rather than vertical
slice. In such cases it would appear improper to limit the Coady
and Marett decisions to their respective facts.
If the warehousing assets and activities meet the five-year active
business requirements of section 355, then could not the assets and
activities associated with the real estate employed in a corporation's
primary business be spun off? Three cases have dealt, at least in
part, with the real estate question. In Theodore F. Appleby8 7 the
court held the corporate activities of providing a building for the
principal business (insurance) of the corporation did not constitute
the active conduct of a trade or business under section 355. Simi-
larly, the real estate activities of a wholesale linoleum company88 and
M See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 50-51 (1954).
5 35 T.C. 755 (1961), aff'd per curiam, 296 F.2d 925 (3d Cir. 1962).8 8 Bonsall v. Commissioner, 317 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1963).
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an engineering company 9 have failed to pass active business muster.
Even, if the regulations are liberalized to accommodate the hori-
zontal division of vertically integrated businesses, it is doubtful
whether real estate used in the principal business of the distributing
or controlled corporation will qualify as an active business. Unless
more than half of the real property is occupied by persons other than
the distributing corporation, or a related corporation, the corpora-
tion conducting the real estate business may not satisfy the active
business tests of section 355.
In Marne S. Wilson90 the Tax Court held that the financing of
installment notes receivable, acquired by a retail furniture business,
constituted a separate active business conducted for the requisite five-
year period. The court's finding that the financing business was a
separate business precludes reading Wilson as holding that a single
vertically integrated business may be divided under section 355.
The Wilson financing activities produced interest income from its
customers (not from a related party) and encompassed all the opera-
tions forming a part of or step in the process of earning income from
financing.
If warehousing activities, parking lot activities, and delivery
activities do not satisfy the active business tests of section 355 when,
after the distribution, they derive income only from the other pre-
distribution corporation, at what point will business transactions
with unrelated parties convert these activities into active businesses?
If, for example, for five years prior to the separation the warehouse
owned by the department store has rented sixty per cent of its space
to other merchants and after the separation derives sixty per cent of
its income from these other merchants, it seems that the warehouse
could be spun off under section 355. In fact, is not the corporation
in the warehousing business?
A bank which rented ten of its eleven floors to various tenants
has qualified as being in the real estate business under the present
regulations. 91 Note, however, that another bank which leased only
twenty-five per cent of its space to unrelated parties failed the active
business test on the ground that renting such space was only inci-
89 Isabel A. Elliott, 32 T.C. 283 (1959).
-042 T.C. 914 (1964), rev'd on other grounds, 353 F.2d 184 (9th Cir. 1965).
91 Treas. Reg. § 1.355-1 (d), Example (3) (1955).
[Vol. 1967: 1
THE ANATOMY OF A SPIN-OFF
dental to its banking business.92 If our warehouse rents only thirty
per cent of its space, or derives only thirty per cent of its income from
transactions with unrelated parties, will it qualify as an active busi-
ness? Unless transactions with unrelated parties constitute at least
fifty per cent of the activities of any service function such as ware-
housing, delivery, or parking lot operations, corporate separations
probably should not be advised without an advance ruling from the
Service. Whether favorable rulings will be granted in these less
than fifty per cent cases may depend on the tests promulgated by
the new regulations.
ONE BUSINESS OR Two: A NEw TWIST TO THE Coady PROBLEM
Prior to the Service's announcement that it would follow the
Coady and Marett decisions, the typical spin-off case found the tax-
payer arguing that he satisfied the pre-distribution two-separate-
business test of the regulations while the Commissioner argued that
only a single business was involved. 93 The Service now approves of
the vertical slicing of a properly aged (five-year) single business, while
the division of two separate businesses, one of which has not received
the necessary five-year aging, remains taxable. In this setting, new
litigation has arisen with the taxpayer arguing that there is only
one business while the Commissioner maintains there are two busi-
nesses.
Prior to Coady a newly established branch of a business could not
be spun off, since the branch would have been viewed as a new
business without the necessary five-year history; or as an unacceptable
division of a single business. In Patricia W. Burke,"4 however, the
Tax Court held that the incorporation and distribution of a branch
radio parts distributorship qualified as a tax-free spin-off, notwith-
standing that the branch was less than five years old. The Tax Court
found that the branch store, prior to its incorporation, did not carry
on "every operation which forms a part of or step in the process of
earning income from such group." Since the branch did not main-
tain a complete inventory, had no outside salesman, did not have a
functioning bank account, and did not handle its own accounts
receivable, the court found it was only a part of the single radio parts
92 Treas. Reg. § 1.355-1 (d), Example (4) (1955).
" See, e.g., H. Grady Lester, Jr., 40 T.C. 947, 956-58 (1963).
9'42 T.C. 1021 (1964).
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business operated for more than five years by the distributing corpo-
ration. Accordingly, after citing Coady for the proposition that a
single business may be divided, the "vertical slice" was approved.
In Lockwood v. Commissioner,95 the separation of a newly in-
corporated branch with less than a five-year history was allowed. The
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the Tax Court by holding
that the geographical separation of corporate sales activities does not
convert one business into two. Where each of the two post-distribu-
tion businesses is deemed to have a separate business predecessor, and
where one of those predecessors does not possess the requisite five-
year history, we can expect the Commissioner to renew the challenges
made in Burke and Lockwood. But where two operations, such as a
downtown and a suburban department store, constitute only a single
business, the separation of the downtown and suburban stores would
seem permissible, provided at least one of the two stores had been
in business for five or more years..
,THE EXPANDING BuSINESS-PuRposE DOCTRINE
One of the requirements of a tax-free corporate separation is that
it must be responsive to a business purpose. The Ninth Circuit's
recent decision in Commissioner v. Wilson, 0 has been characterized
as a "collector's item among the progeny of Gregory v. Helvering."97
In Wilson, the Ninth Circuit dispelled the assumption that the
presence of a business purpose and the absence of a tax avoidance
motive are two sides of the same coin; the court held that both a valid
business purpose and the absence of tax avoidance are required for
a tax-free spin-off. The case began when the Wilson brothers, who
owned all of the stock of Wilson's Furniture, Inc. ("Furniture"),
decided to have their corporation transfer the conditional sales con-
tracts it had acquired from the corporation's customers to a new
corporation, Wil-Plan, Inc., which was to conduct a finance business.
The stock of Wil-Plan was distributed pro rata to the Wilsons. The
taxpayers treated the receipt of the Wil-Plan stock as a tax-free spin-
off and reported no gain from the transaction in their 1958 returns.
The Commissioner asserted deficiencies against the Wilsons claiming
(1) that the transaction was used principally as a device for the distri-
08 350 F.2d 712 (8th Cir. 1965), reversing 33 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1350 (1964).
"6 353 F.2d 184 (9th Cir. 1965), reversing 42 T.C. 914 (1964).
97 Warren, Pugh & Hallawell, Comment on Wilson, CCH 1965-66 FEDERAL TAXAnON,
CURRENT LAW AND PRACTICE 1142, at 853.
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bution of Furniture's earnings and profits,9 (2) that the spin-off
lacked a valid business purpose,9 and (3) that the spin-off did not
meet the active business requirements of section 355 (b).
The taxpayer advanced three specific business reasons to refute
the Commissioner's assertion that the transfer of the conditional sales
contracts and financing operations to the new corporation had as
one of its principal purposes the distribution of earnings and
profits.100
Although the Tax Court rejected each of the contentions as
providing a valid business reason for the incorporation and distribu-
tion of Wil-Plan, it nevertheless found as a fact that the transaction
was not used principally as a device for the distribution of earnings
and profits.1 1 The Court found that:
Although the assets transferred to Wil-Plan had a high degree of
liquidity, as stressed by the Government, we are satisfied by the
evidence that the Wilsons intended to continue the financing
activities with those assets, and that they had no intention either to
liquidate Wil-Plan, to sell the stock of Wil-Plan, or in any other
manner to siphon off for themselves the assets (or their equivalent)
that had been transferred from Wilson's [Furniture] Inc., to Wil-
Plan. 02
This conclusion rested on the fact that there was credible evidence
that no sale or liquidation was planned and no sale had in fact taken
place in the five years that elapsed from the date of the spin-off to the
Tax Court decision. 0 3 The Tax Court opinion did not deal with
," The accumulated earnings and profits of Furniture at the time Wil-Plan was in-
corporated were approximately $49,000. The fair market value of the Wil-Plan stock
was approximately $138,000. To the extent a distribution exceeds the earnings and
profits of the distributing corporation, it results in capital gain after all the share-
holder's basis in his stock of the distributing corporation is consumed. INT. REv. CODE
or 1954, § 301 (c).
11 While the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Wilson carefully notes that both the Com-
missioner and the taxpayers recognize that a valid business purpose is an essential ele-
ment of a tax-free spin-off, Judge Raum's Tax Court opinion fails to indicate that the
Commissioner argued that a spin-off must have a business purpose, as well as no
device, to qualify under § 355. See Tax Court Brief for Respondent, pp. 18, 19, 24-32;
Reply Brief for Respondent, p. 15.
100 42 T.C. at 922-23. The reasons were: (1) to enable th separate finance company
to make repossessions and to bring suits for delinquent payments in its own name with-
out unfavorable customer reactions and without jeopardizing the good will of Furni-
ture; (2) to enable the separate finance company to purchase more easily conditional
sales contracts from other retail stores; and (3) to make the sales program of Furniture
more effident by having its personnel devote all their time to selling.101 d. at 923.
02' Ibid.
108 Id. at 924.
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the Commissioner's argument that, notwithstanding the absence of
a device, a spin-off must be a non-tax-motivated transaction which
has sufficient valid business reasons for the separation of the busi-
nesses and the direct ownership of both by the shareholders.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit found itself
confronted with what may be a unique situation, that of a corpora-
tion reorganization which had no business reason and which had
no tax avoidance purpose, but which had the effect of removing
from the risks and vicissitudes of a retail furniture business accum-
ulated earnings in a form readily convertible by the shareholders
into cash, by selling their stock in the spin-off corporation or by
liquidating it and receiving and selling those easily liquidated
assets.104
The court of appeals found that the valid business purpose re-
quirement cannot be satisfied by merely showing an absence of tax
avoidance. The doctrine of Gregory v. Helvering10 was held to
require more than literal compliance with the statutory spin-off pro-
visions; there must have been a valid business purpose.
The importance of the Commissioner's victory in Wilson is
readily appreciated when one examines the implications of a contrary
decision. Had the court held that spin-offs no longer had to satisfy
business purpose tests but rather only had to satisfy the device clause
requirements, taxpayers could spin-off any active business. After
the period of limitations on assessment had run, if the Commissioner
had not questioned the spin-off, the shareholders could sell or liqui-
date either one of the post-distribution corporations at capital gain
rates. Presumably, even near-liquid assets, such as the installment
notes receivable employed in a finance business, could have been dis-
tributed to the shareholders via this route. If the Commissioner
asserted a deficiency against the shareholders during the period for
assessment by claiming that the distribution was a device, the share-
holders could have continued to hold their shares in both corpo-
rations until their case had been tried. Their failure to sell or liqui-
date either corporation in the five or seven years following the spin-
off would have been cogent evidence of the absence of a device.
Thus, in effect, the bailout of earnings could have been accomplished
by means of a three- or five-year "holding period." Whether such a
104 353 F.2d at 187.
205 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
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result was intended by Congress would appear to have been answered
in 1954 by the Senate Finance Committee's rejection of the House
bill's provisions permitting "a person in a position to afford a 10-year
delay in receiving income do so at capital gain rather than dividend
rates."106
Prior to the Wilson decision, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
in Estate of Parshelsky v. Commissioner,10 7 had commented:
In light of the tax-avoidance possibilities which a spin-off often
provides, there must be non-tax reasons not only for separation of
the two businesses but also for direct ownership of both by the
shareholders.108
The Wilson and Parshesky decisions leave little doubt that at
least two circuits believe the business purpose requirements first
enunciated in Gregory have continuing vitality under the 1954 and
1939 Codes. Although the legislative history accompanying sec-
tion 112 (b) (11) of the 1939 Code109 and section 355 of the 1954
0I S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 50-51 (1954).
1.7 303 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1962).
108 Id. at 20.
"
9Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 112 (b) (11), added by ch. 521, 65 Stat. 493 (1951) was
designed, in part, to prevent Gregory-type bailouts. It contained an active business
requirement and a device clause. But these provisions were not intended to limit the
Commissioner or the courts. This section "has been drafted so as to limit its benefits
to reorganizations in which all of the new corporations as well as the parent are in-
tended to carry on a business after the reorganization .... ." S. REP. No. 781, 82d
Cong., 1st Sess. 58 (1951), reprinted in 1951-2 Cum. BuLL. 458, 499. Under the device
clause of the 1951 Act where the stock of one of the two post-distribution corpora-
tions was sold or the corporation liquidated shortly after the spin-off, "especially if the
sale was pre-arranged, an inference would arise that the spin-off was a belated substi-
tute for ordinary dividends and the spin-off would not enjoy tax-free status. Ibid.; see
BrrrxER, op. cit. supra note 61, at 326. Congressman Camp, sponsor of § 112 (b) (11) in
the House, addressed himself to the history of the taxation of spin-offs while discussing
H.R. 7738 and H.R. 7725, 96 CONG. REc. A1978, A1980 (1950): "A similar pro-
vision was contained in section 112 (g) of the Revenue Act of 1932 and prior acts but
this was omitted in the Revenue Act of 1934 because the decision of the Board of Tax
Appeals in Evelyn F. Gregory (27 B.T.A. 223 (1932)) indicated that such provision
might be subject to abuse and held to apply to what was regarded as in substance the
distribution of a dividend. The reversal of that decision in 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934),
affirmed 293 U.S. 465 (1935), removed the danger of such abuse. Judicial and admin-
istrative interpretation of the law since 1934 has established safeguards which now
prevent such abuse of the reorganization provisions." In Estate of Parshelsky v. Com-
missioner, 303 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1962), the taxpayer argued that the two specific pro-
visions of § 112 (b) (11), the "active business" and "device" restrictions, have occupied
the field so that the "business-purpose" method of statutory interpretation does not
apply. The legislative history of the 1951 Act makes it clear that Congress was very
concerned with tax evasion schemes of the Gregory type when it enacted § 112 (b) (11).
Representative Camp stated that if the bill was passed spin-offs would be "subject to
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Code n° amply demonstrate that Congress intended to pass legislation
which prohibited a recurrence of Gregory-type devices, these courts
and the regulations"" have concluded that the statutory restrictions
are nonexclusive remedies.
In the future, we can expect that the Commissioner will insist
that there be substantial nontax reasons both for the separation of
the businesses to be conducted after the distribution and for the
direct ownership of both of the post-distribution corporations by the
shareholders.1 2 One can readily conceive of some situations which
would meet these requirements. An antitrust divestiture order re-
quiring the distribution of one of the businesses conducted by a
corporation would be a substantial nontax reason both for the separa-
tion of the two businesses and for the direct ownership of each busi-
ness by the shareholders." 3 Similarly, in situations like Coady,
where the shareholders can no longer agree on the proper means of
conducting a business, a non-pro-rata split-off satisfies the business
purpose standards. The business must be divided and it is essential
that the two post-separation businesses be separately owned by the
shareholders. The Parshelsky decision indicates that the business
purpose must be one which requires a distribution and not merely
the formation of a new subsidiary. Even if the courts had accepted
as valid the three purported business reasons for the Wilson spin-
off," 4 it is questionable whether any of these reasons would satisfy
the general limitations embodied in the Gregory case and subsequent decisions based
thereon." 96 CONG. RiEc. A1978, A1980 (1950). "Therefore, to the extent that
§ 112 (b) (ll)'s two provisos are not as broad as the judicial safeguard of statutory in-
terpretation, Congress did not intend to shackle the courts .... Estate of Parshelsky
v. Commissioner, supra at 18 n.7.
'
1 0
"Congress, in enacting section 355 and its predecessors, was trying to give busi-
ness enterprises leeway in readjusting their corporate arrangements to better suit their
business purpose. If the rearrangement had that purpose, Congress was willing to
concede them some possible tax advantages. If the rearrangement had no business
purpose, let the taxes fall where they might." Commissioner v. Wilson, 353 F.2d 184,
187 (9th Cir. 1965).
I'lTreas. Reg. § 1.355-2 (c) (1955). The regulations require that the distribution
must be germane to the business "of the corporations." At least two courts have
accepted the principle that valid shareholder purposes will also qualify. Estate of
Parshelsky v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d 14, 20-21 (2d Cir. 1962); Lewis v. Commissioner,
176 F.2d 646, 649-50 (Ist Cir. 1949).1 12 An example of a situation which prompted a favorable ruling from the Com-
missioner may be found in Rev. Rul. 56-554, 1956-2 Cum. BULL. 198, where a bank
which considered the holding of relatively speculative assets undesirable was permit-
ted to distribute them in a spin-off.
113See generally Cohen, Current Partial Liquidation and Spin-Off Problems, 41
TAxEs 775-79 (1963).
2' See note 100 supra.
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this aspect of the business purpose doctrine set forth in Parshelsky.
A subsidiary finance corporation could make repossessions and bring
legal actions in its own name without jeopardizing the customer rela-
tions of its parent. The sales force of the parent could be completely
separated from the financing activities of the subsidiary. Further-
more, it is at least questionable whether other retail stores would
have any greater reluctance to sell conditional sales contracts to a
subsidiary corporation than to a sister corporation of Furniture.
Where the business purpose is to insulate the assets of one busi-
ness from the risks of another business, the purpose usually can be
accomplished by placing the risky business in a subsidiary.115 If
both businesses are subject to extreme fluctuations, a bona fide
intent to provide mutual limited liability might justify a spin-off.
But could not the desired limited liability be achieved by forming two
new subsidiaries?
Although the Commissioner lost the Parshelsky case on remand" 6
because the Tax Court found that the shareholder's estate plan con-
stituted a valid business purpose both for the separation of the two
businesses and the direct ownership of each by the taxpayer, the Sec-
ond Circuit opinion in conjunction with the Ninth Circuit opinion in
Wilson should provide an interesting basis for the resolution of
business purpose problems in the future. The newly vitalized
business purpose doctrine looms as a substantial deterrent to those
who might wish to utilize the spin-off provisions to bail out the
earnings of their corporation.
'SPIN-OFFS AND SMALL BUSINESS CORPORATIONS
Although the provisions pertaining to spin-offs and electing small
business corporations are literally more than a thousand section
numbers apart, their relationship is frequently considerably more
proximate. A complete discussion of the interrelationship of section
355 and Subchapter S is beyond the scope of this article, but some of
the problems and recent developments may be mentioned.
Assume that an electing small business corporation is engaged
115Where the affairs of a business subject to governmental regulation (e.g., an
insurance company) would be adversely affected by having its net worth continually
fluctuate because of its investment in the economically gyrating subsidiary, a valid
business purpose for the direct ownership of both corporations by the shareholders
may be presenL,
11 32 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1033 (1963).
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in two businesses-selling appliances and renting real estate. The
corporation's accountant has advised the sole shareholder that the
rental income from the real estate business will exceed twenty per
cent of the corporation's gross receipts in its next taxable year. To
avoid having the Subchapter S election terminated,117 the share-
holder proposes to spin off the real estate business. Since the avowed
purpose of the spin-off is to retain the corporation's Subchapter S
election, are the requirements of a substantial nontax reason for the
separation and distribution satisfied? Furthermore, the mechanics
of a spin-off present some substantial technical problems under Sub-
chapter, S. Section 1371 (a) excludes from the definition of a "small
business corporation" any corporation which is a member of an
affiliated group (as defined in section 1504) and any corporation
which has another corporation as its shareholder. In order to effect
a spin-off it is necessary to organize a controlled corporation, the
stock of which is then distributed to the shareholder of the dis-
tributing corporation. If the real estate business is placed in the
controlled corporation pursuant to the spin-off plan, there is a
moment in time when the two corporations are members of the same
affiliated group. If the appliance business is placed in the controlled
corporation pursuant to the spin-off plan, in addition to the affiliated
group problem, the controlled corporation also has a shareholder
other than an individual, namely, the distributing corporation. The
Service has not yet ruled whether momentary affiliation or a momen-
tary corporate shareholder will terminate a Subchapter S election.113
The numerous section 355 safeguards designed to prevent the
bailout of earnings by a corporation's shareholders were significantly
blunted (albeit unintentionally) when Subchapter S was enacted in
1958. Assume that all of the stock of automobile dealership corpora-
21 7 INT. RaEV. CODE oF 1954, § 1372 (e) (5) provides, in part, that a Subchapter S
election shall terminate if, for any taxable year, more than twenty per cent of its gross
receipts are derived from passive income (royalties, rents, dividends, interest, annuities
and gains on the sales of stock or securities). Note, however, the limited exception
to the foregoing rule for certain new corporations contained in § 1872 (e) (5) (B) (added
in 1966).
118But cf. Rev. Rul. 64-250, 1964-2 CuM. BuLL. 333, where the Service held that a
reorganization under § 368 (a) (1) (F) did not terminate a Subchapter S election. In
an F reorganization, all of the assets of the transferor corporation are exchanged for all
of the stock of the transferee corporations, INT. REV. CODE oF 1954, § 361, which is then
distributed to the shareholders of the transferor corporation, INT. REV. CODE oF 1954,
§ 354. Thus, the F reorganization, like the spin-off, involves momentary affiliation and
a momentary corporate shareholder.
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tion X is owned by individual A. Over the years, successful opera-
tions have enabled X to purchase with retained earnings the land
and buildings used in its business. A bank is willing to purchase the
land and buildings, which have an adjusted basis of 50,000 dollars,
from X for 250,000 dollars and then will lease the land and buildings
back to X for thirty years at an annual rental of 10,000 dollars.
Assuming that A can successfully overcome any sale-and-leaseback
arguments which could be advanced by the Commissioner, A can
bail out 250,000 dollars of X's earnings if he can acquire title to the
land and building prior to the sale to the bank.
If the property is distributed directly to A by X, it will be taxed
as a dividend to him-a tax result he would not relish. A partial
liquidation under section 346 cannot be effected since the real estate
does not constitute a separate business under section 346 (b) and
there is no corporate contraction as required by section 346 (a).
Moreover, a tax-free spin-off is not available since the real estate
activities do not satisfy the active business tests. Prior to 1966 a
"one-shot" election under Subchapter S119 might have achieved the
desired result, at least to the extent of 200,000 dollars. Under this
plan, the corporation would elect to be taxed as a small business
corporation, and in the year of the election, X would sell the real
estate to the bank and lease it back. The 200,000 dollars gain on the
sale would be treated as long-term capital gain under section 1231,
subject to the recapture provisions of section 1250. Moreover, the
200,000 .dollars could be distributed to A by X. Thus, a single
capital gain tax would be paid on the sale and distribution. Perhaps
the only serious drawback to this arrangement is that all of the
income from the automobile distributorship must be reported by A
during the years the election is in effect.
In 1966, Congress substantially narrowed the scope of this bailout
loophole.120 Section 1378, for all taxable years beginning after
April 14, 1966, provides that if the long-term capital gains of an
electing small business corporation exceed 25,000 dollars in a given
year and constitute more than fifty per cent of the corporation's
taxable income (which must be more than 25,000 dollars), the corpo-
110 The Service has apparently sanctioned Subchapter S elections even where the
purpose of such elections was to pass through capital gains derived from the sale of
corporate assets. See Rev. Rul. 65-292, 1965-2 Cuau. BULL 319, where a Subchapter S
election was utilized to effect a partial liquidation on the installment basis.2 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1878.
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ration must pay a tax equal to twenty-five per cent of the gain in
excess of 25,000 dollars or an ordinary income tax on its taxable
income, whichever is less. These additional tax provisions do not
apply to electing small business corporations which have had an
election in effect for at least three years preceding the taxable year
of the capital gain, or to corporations which have been in existence
for less than four taxable years and have elected Subchapter S treat-
ment since their incorporation. Although some of its intricacies may
be somewhat difficult to digest, section 1378 is intended to prevent
a passthrough election which allows the corporation to avoid a capital
gains tax12 1 and incidentally prevents using Subchapter S elections to
effect bailouts by the electing shareholder.
CONCLUSION
Our understanding of the purpose and application of section 355
has been significantly advanced in the dozen years since the 1954
Code was enacted. Yet, numerous significant questions remain for
future resolution by the courts, taxpayers, the Treasury Depart-
ment, and perhaps Congress. In the next twelve years we shall un-
questionably learn more of what constitutes an active business within
the historical and statutory framework of section 355; we can expect
the courts to furnish additional guidance in the nebulous business
purpose area; and we can look forward to more definitive admin-
istrative answers to numerous questions including the division of a
single, vertically integrated business. If our experience in the last
twelve years teaches us anything, it is that we cannot safely predict
all the interpretative problems which will arise in the future or the
contexts in which they will present themselves. No matter how they
arise or whatever their context, we can safely predict that the coming
years will produce greater understanding and appreciation of the
problems which accompany the spin-off provisions.
121 H.R. REP. No. 1258, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1966); S. RrS'. No. 1007, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess. 2, 6-8 (1966).
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